COM 657 2-2 Short Paper
Abstract
This short paper examines the crisis response strategies employed by various responsible entities during 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, along with the effect of said strategies on public perception of both disaster response and governmental agency responsibility.
Keywords: Hurricane Katrina, FEMA, Nagin, Blanco, Mike Brown, crisis communication, response strategy, SCCT, ethics.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina set the bar for the magnitude of loss of life in the United States, and was the first major test of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s capabilities since it was merged with the Department of Homeland Security (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Of particular interest was—and still is, since they continue to be studied and referred to—the crisis management strategies that were or were not employed, the public reaction thereto, and the consequences thereof.
Background
That Hurricane Katrina earned the description of the worst disaster to hit the United States in a hundred years (June’s Journal, 2005) is, perhaps, a somewhat reasonable explanation for the faults in crisis management that have been observed. Interviews with Mayor Nagin (June’s Journal, 2005) and Governor Blanco of Louisiana (CNN, 2005) both reveal the frustration each felt at the direction in which crisis communication and management were going, and the audience particularly can pick up on certain lacks in communication that are evident particularly during the Blanco interview. While it is tempting to place blame on one or two individuals or entities, it seems evidence that the breakdown in communication was the result of a failure of communication within the entire organizational network that was engaged in crisis response (Coombs & Holladay, 2010), as can be gleaned from the assertion that crises form not simply as a result of a triggering event, but more as a result of weaknesses that exist within the responding organizations (Chapter 4).
Crisis Communication Concepts in Evidence
Several SCCT response strategy types are in evidence: in an interview with CNN (2005), Governor Blanco uses denial strategy (Coombs & Holladay, 2010) to excuse herself from the responsibility of being specific about what particular types of help she was requesting for Lousiana, and turns the federal government, specifically the presidential administration, into a scapegoat for not somehow intuitively comprehending her unspecified (and unspoken) request for military personnel to aid in evacuation, anti-looting and rescue/recovery efforts (CNN, 2005). When the interviewer pins her down regarding which day (of the crisis) she actually requested—again, specifically—troops be sent, Governor Blanco disingenuously pleads exhaustion and a lack of recall as to the day—thereby leaning on the diminishment strategies of providing excuses and justification (Coombs & Holladay, 2010)—again until the interviewer pins her down. While it may indeed have been a challenge to determine precisely what sorts of aid Louisiana required, given the chaos on the ground and the lack of power, water, and other essentials, the situation was telling in two ways: first, that it appears that a detailed inter-organizational crisis management plan had never been drawn up, let alone a crisis communication plan; and two, that Governor Blanco felt compelled to shift any blame from herself to another entity.
The governor’s office was not the only entity that demonstrated a SCCT response strategies: FEMA also turned to diminishment strategies to excuse itself of responsibility for the depth of the crisis, instead pointing the proverbial finger at the governor’s office and at the federal government—this is also an example of denial strategy in making the latter two agencies scapegoats (Coombs & Holladay, 2010).
All four entities involved—the presidential administration, the Louisiana governor’s office, FEMA, and the New Orleans mayoral office (on behalf of the city itself) claimed victim status (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Bush’s administration claimed that partisan/political differences hampered its ability to respond appropriately to the crisis (denial and diminishment strategies), FEMA blamed the lack of available troops on the recent deployment of troops to Iraq (also denial and diminishment strategies), and Blanco asserted that her office was the victim of other entities’ lack of response to and understand of her requests (scapegoating strategy). It appears that only the entity claiming legitimately claiming victim status is the major’s office on behalf of the City of New Orleans, per SCCT tenets.
Public Perception and Ethical Reasoning
The public’s perception of and reaction to these various strategies can be seen in various ways. Blanco, for example, is met with skepticism and distrust (CNN, 2005) as a result of her perceived reluctance to take responsibility for any of the challenges faced and her attempt to push the entire blame wholesale onto other entities (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). In the interview (CNN, 2005), Blanco is clearly seen to be avoiding answering direct and pointed questions as to her role in the lack of crisis response, thereby failing in her responsibility of being open, transparent and genuine in her leadership. Additionally, Coombs and Holladay (2010) assert that public reaction denigrated her lack of compassion toward both victims of the hurricane and subsequent activity as well as those residents who felt that their only means of survival rested on “liberating” (i.e., looting) resources until further help arrived. It is perhaps difficult to imagine that such residents would show trust or forbearance when feeling abandoned by their state.
Coombs and Holladay (2010) further point to evidence of public reaction in their hurricane timeline (Table 4.1): racial accusations arise on September 2, followed closely on September 6 by state officials’ accusations of bureaucratic obstacles. FEMA marred its public reputation with the short-lived, three-day-long debit card program (a rebuilding and bolstering strategy that they could not implement effectively); FEMA then further damaged said reputation with the Associated Press’s unearthing of a 400-page report as to the awareness and consequences of a representative hurricane situation in Louisiana, leading to Mike Brown’s resignation (granted, this last action may not be the direct result of public perception, as such positions are appointed and not elected, but considering the public outcry over the entire handling of Katrina and the extremely precarious political climate, it is not unreasonable to assume that public perceptions and reactions did play a major role in Brown’s resignation).
Conclusion
In typical “chicken-or-egg” fashion, the question arises as to whether or not President Bush’s surprising employment of rebuilding strategy in the form of mortification (Coombs & Holladay, 2010) was precipitated by public backlash to the crisis response and public perceptions of government in general; or whether public perception was nudged into a different direction by Bush’s mortification strategy in the form of an acceptance of responsibility and genuine apology, coming as it did on the heels of hitherto opposite (denial and diminishment) strategies by other government entities, including FEMA and Blanco’s office. Bush had previously employed scapegoat strategies in blaming FEMA for the “unacceptable” response (Table 4.1), but then took a stand as well as responsibility for the magnitude of the resulting damage and suffering. It is not unreasonable to posit, therefore, that public reaction—however enraged at the situation in general and at Blanco’s office in particular—swung back toward the presidential administration’s favor as a result.
References
CNN. (2005). Kathleen Blanco Interview. Retrieved from CNN: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JS-nfiLO570
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (Eds.). (2010). The handbook of crisis communication. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
June’s Journal. (2005). Interview with Mayor Ray Nagin (Mayor of New Orleans). Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5I733dMOUA&t=47s